Bad Apple!
BPAI Rejects Apple Patent Reissue on Equitable Principles
CAFC to Decide Prosecution Laches in Patent Reissue
Earlier this year we discussed the Ex Parte Tanaka decision of the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (BPAI) with respect to “bullet claims” in patent reissue, now before the CAFC. On June 24, 2010, a second Board decision relating to patent reissue was appealed to the Federal Circuit (Ex Parte Staats).
Although presented in the context of patent reissue, the point of contention in Staats is actually one of prosecution laches and the application of equitable principles to statutory interpretation. In Staats, the Board upheld a rejection of a broadening reissue application as defective under 35 U.S.C. 251 for failing to include the appropriate broadening oath within two years of the original patent issuance. The Board reasoned that although a parent reissue had filed an appropriate broadening oath and identified at least one error, the continuation reissue was not entitled to rely on that oath, despite the continuity between these reissue applications. The BPAI presented the issue as :
This is a case of first impression. Resolution of the case hinges on one fundamental question: Can a continuing reissue application broaden patented claims beyond the statutory two-year period in a manner unrelated to the broadening aspect that was identified within the two-year period? Put another way, is it enough under the law to merely present an intent to broaden that is limited to a particular aspect (e.g., a particular embodiment of the invention) within the two-year period, yet broaden in unforeseeable ways (e.g., pertaining to other embodiments) outside the two-year period?
While the Board noted that the question of interpreting 35 U.S.C. 251 in this manner was a case of first impression, MPEP 1412.03 (IV) was argued by Apple as directly on point (i.e., explicitly authorizing the practice). Curiously, the Board found this aspect of the MPEP ambiguous, and analyzed the statute based upon their understanding of the equitable principles behind the two-year limitation provided by the statute.
In doing so, the BPAI relied heavily on the aspect of foreseeability emphasized in case law addressing prosecution laches. In affirming the rejection, the BPAI surmised:
Since this broadening was completely unforeseeable by the public within the two-year statutory period-a circumstance that is undisputed-it runs counter to the public notice function underpinning § 251 and is therefore improper.
In arriving at their conclusion on equitable principles, the BPAI reviewed the seminal cases in this area (In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877, 42 USPQ2d 1471, 1473-74 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and (In re Doll, 419 F.2d 925, 928, 164 USPQ 218, 220 (CCPA 1970). The Board noted that both of these early decisions supported their conclusion that the manner of broadening must be identified within two years.
Arguably, neither of these cases needed to consider the manner of the broadening. Thus, the Board noted only that the facts of Doll were consistent with their decision, and Graff emphasized the two year requirement. So, to buttress their decision, the Board relied on case law relating to prosecution laches, such as Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Res. Found., 277 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
However, the cases dealing with foreseeability in the prosecution laches context relate to applications that were prosecuted in secret (i.e., before the days of publication). As reissue applications are published in the Official Gazette, foreseeability with respect to specific changes is only a mouse click away via PAIR. Certainly, in the past, there was significant motivation to purposely delay prosecution in the days of “submarine applications.” However, by waiting 8 years to file the continuation reissue application in question, Apple only surrendered enforceable patent term to the public (intervening rights).
There is little motivation for anyone to drag their feet in reissue, likewise, the manner of broadening is not the least bit secret. Interested parties cannot not only track the progress of such broadening publicly, but are provided a mechanism to protest via the submission of prior art under 37 CFR 1.291.
Should be an interesting CAFC opinion, stay tuned.
English



“W[w]aiting 8 years to file the continuation reissue application in question..” ? How long has the PTO and/or the applicant now delayed this reissue from its ORIGINAL filing date? If largely the latter, prosecution laches was a very approporate fallback rejection by the Board.
Such long PTO reissue handling delays are as inexcusable as PTO reexamination delays. Most patents in reissue, like most patents in reexamination, are important patents vastly more likely to be, or already being, asserted and/or lititigated than normal patents. Plus reissues so rare that there is no excuse for the PTO n,ot to properly devote the small amount of its resources and management supervision needed to very promptly act on them.
The 8 year delay was measured from issue date.
The reissue applications were prosecuted in serial fashion by Apple, so, I don’t see any blame on the delay resting with the PTO. (aside from ignoring the realities of the situation).
In my experience, the USPTO will not allow parallel prosecution of reissue continuations, but will instead suspend parallel reissue proceedings in favor of a first filed. The rationale being that the identification of mistakes in the various oaths do not overlap and the PTO can take the applications one at a time.
As you point out, such applicatons are likely important. As the delay only hurts Apple, applying an equitable principle in the name of public interest fairness seems misguided to me.
Scott,
Thanks for your post. I had previously seen this decision and am glad there is an appeal–I think that your analysis is spot on and that the Board created ambiguity where none existed. I agree that their decision should have rested squarely on laches rather than under 251, although I don’t think laches is present, as I can’t see how the facts in the case are much different from a continuation filed in a non-reissue setting, particularly given there is no question of the patentee getting extra term by the delayed filing (as you point out).
I am interested to see how the appeal plays out, particularly the PTO’s brief.
Thanks Dean. But can you explain why the Board’s “decision should have rested squarely on laches” when “laches is not present.” Also, where specifically is the ambiguity in the Board decision?
Scott Daniels
Westerman Hattori Daniels & Adrian