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Archive for January 30th, 2013

Multi-Defendant Troll Suits to Drive Joinder Filings at PTAB

PTAB joinderStayed Litigations to Drive Joinder Practice

Inter partes reviews (IPRs) are now understood to be effective tools for parties defending against patent infringement suits filed by non-practicing entities, sometimes called “patent trolls.” Typically patent trolls launch suits against multiple entities and district courts commonly consolidate such cases for purposes of discovery. In some cases, this leads to the formation of joint defense groups, which provide various efficiencies and advantages on the litigation side of the fence. However, joint defense group members almost always have differing views when it comes to the decision whether and when to file an IPR.

In the typical situation, a “deep pocket” defendant with the most to lose will move forward in filing the IPR, then move to stay the costlier litigation proceeding. The Patentee will then oppose the motion, pointing out that the litigation is unlikely to be simplified by a stay because any potential estoppel stemming from the IPR is binding only with respect to the real party in interest (i.e. deep pocket filer). Faced with the prospect of the motion for stay being denied on this ground, the remaining defendants will begrudgingly stipulate to be bound by the same estoppel as that attaching to the real party in interest. Yet, this stipulation now places such defendants in the unenviable position of being bound by a proceeding they may not have wanted in the first instance.

In the past case of inter partes patent reexamination, such “me too’ defendants were forced to sit on the sideline and place their fate in the hands of the real party in interest; such situations proved quite problematic. For example, should the deep pocket defendant settle with the Patentee, the reexamination could then proceed unopposed and the inter partes reexamination would transform into a statistically less desirable, pseudo, ex parte reexamination proceeding. In other words there was no way for the other defendants to secure a right to participate along side the real party, or substitute themselves in the place of the real party should settlement occur— not so in IPR. Read the rest of this entry »