Archive for the ‘Claim Interpretation’ Category

USPTO Reexamination of Means Plus Function Claims

Posted On: Feb. 5, 2010   By: Scott A. McKeown

goodfellas_painting-small–A Tale of Two Statutes –

When explaining the reexamination practices relating to means plus function claims, I am often reminded of my favorite line from the movie Goodfellas.  In the movie, Joe Pesci explains a painting (right) on his mother’s dining room wall to his friends, he describes the painting as follows:  Oh, I like this one…One dog goes one way, the other dog goes the other way, and this guy’s in the middle is sayin’, “Whadda ya want from me? ”

When it comes to reexamination of means-plus-function claims, the USPTO is clearly in the middle, situated between conflicting statutory perspectives.

It is well established that patent reexamination is granted only for substantial new questions of patentability based on patents and printed publications.  Outside of limited circumstances relating to intervening art, 35 USC § 112 is not considered in relation to original patent claims of an issued patent in reexamination.[1]

In this regard, MPEP 2258 (II) notes that:

Where new claims are presented or where any part of the disclosure is amended, the claims of the reexamination proceeding, are to be examined for compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112. Consideration of 35 U.S.C. 112 issues should, however, be limited to the amendatory (e.g., new language) matter. For example, a claim which is amended or a new claim which is presented containing a limitation not found in the original patent claim should be considered for compliance under 35 U.S.C. 112 only with respect to that limitation. To go further would be inconsistent with the statute to the extent that 35 U.S.C. 112 issues would be raised as to matter in the original patent claim. . .  (emphasis added)

The above noted prohibition against analyzing original patent claims for 112 compliance in reexamination is wholly inconsistent with Read the rest of this entry »

The Rambus Patent Rexaminations

Posted On: Feb. 1, 2010   By: Scott A. McKeown

tony

Fashioning New and Improved Weapons?

Rambus® has been on quite a roll recently, successfully navigating countless legal challenges to their DRAM patent portfolio in the federal courts.  In widely publicized patent based disputes with Infineon, Hynix, Samsung and others, Rambus,® after years of legal wrangling, was successful in securing license fees.  At the same time, Rambus® overcame allegations of fraud in relation to their conduct in the JEDEC standard setting organization. In recent years, Rambus® became subject of antitrust and anti-competitive behavior investigations of the Federal Trade Commission, all of which were concluded favorably to the company.      

More recently, in the continuing campaign to license the industry for their patented technology, Rambus® has taken on Nvidia® in the ITC.  In a decision issued January 22, 2010, Administrative Law Judge Essex issued an initial determination finding that three of the Rambus® patents were infringed, and determined not to be invalid.  These patents are 7,287,109; 6,591,353; and 6,470,405. Interestingly, the USPTO is concurrently reviewing the same patents in inter partes reexamination responsive to Nvidia’s requests of April of 2009.  To the USPTO’s credit these patent reexaminations have proceeded swiftly, reaching a preliminary conclusion (ACP, close of prosecution) in less than 12 months time (finding the claims of these patents obvious over certain prior art i.e., invalid).[1]

Why the inconsistency between the two government bodies?

In short, the standards of proof are different, as are the rules of claim interpretation.  In the ITC and federal district courts, a patent may be invalidated by clear and convincing evidence only, and claims of an issued patent are presumed valid, and construed to preserve their validity.  In the USPTO, the standard of evidence is a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no presumption of validity, hence the attractiveness of patent reexamination to defendants.[2]  

So, with things going well in the ITC, and not so well at the USPTO, how do the ongoing reexaminations impact the ITC?  

It is difficult to predict whether or not the ITC, or, later, the almost certain Nvidia appeal to the Federal Circuit will be in any way impeded by the reexamination status.  If past cases offer any guidance, the ITC is largely unconcerned with concurrent reexamination proceedings, especially at this late stage of the ITC proceeding.  If Judge Newman’s dissent in the recent Fresenius Medical case is to be given weight, the Federal Circuit is likewise inclined to go about its business at least until there is a decision by the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (BPAI); in this regard, the race is clearly on.   However, even assuming the patent reexamination status could be leveraged on appeal, closely watching the situation leads me to believe that Rambus® is very close to unveiling a new weapon in the fight against Nvidia®. Read the rest of this entry »

“Nose of Wax” Revisited and Should 35 USC § 145 be Revised to Apply to Reexaminations?

Posted On: Jan. 22, 2010   By: W. Todd Baker

In an earlier post, we inquired whether patent claims at the PTO are treated like a “nose of wax.”  Generally, a claim examined by the PTO is given its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the specification of the application or patent in which it appears.  One notable exception to the general rule arises in interferences where an applicant “copies” the claim of a targeted patent or application to provoke the interference.  In this case, if a party challenges the patentability of the “copied” claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the “copied” claim is interpreted in light of the specification of the targeted patent or applicationSee Agilent v. Affymetrix, 567 F.3d 1366, 91 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  

A request for an en banc rehearing of the Agilent panel decision was denied by the Federal Circuit.  In Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”) v. Cardiac Science Operating Company (“Cardiac Science”) (Fed. Cir. case No. 2009-1241), a second panel of the Federal Circuit has maintained that, when a party challenges the patentability of a “copied” claim Read the rest of this entry »

Are Patent Claims Treated Like a “Nose of Wax” at the U.S.P.T.O?

Posted On: Dec. 3, 2009   By: W. Todd Baker

Generally, a claim examined by the U.S.P.T.O is given its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the specification of the application or patent in which it appears (hereinafter “broad reasonable standard”).  The rationale for applying the broad reasonable standard is that claims of applications and patents examined by the U.S.P.T.O can be amended. (MPEP § 2111)  There are, however, two important and little known exceptions when the broad reasonable standard is not applied by the U.S.P.T.O.

One exception arises in interferences where an applicant “copies” the claim of a targeted patent or application to provoke the interference.  In this case, if a party challenges the patentability of the “copied” claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the “copied” claim is interpreted in light of the specification of the targeted patent or applicationSee Agilent v. Affymetrix, 567 F.3d 1366, 91 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A second exception arises when an expired patent is in ex parte or inter partes reexamination.  In patent reexamination proceedings, reexamination of an expired patent is proper since the patent remains enforceable for six years after expiration (to collect past damages) and its claims cannot be amended once the patent expires.  MPEP § 2258(I)(G) provides the following guidance on claim interpretation during reexamination:

claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification and limitations in the specification are not read into the claims (In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 222 USPQ 934 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In a reexamination proceeding involving claims of an expired patent, claim construction pursuant to the principle set forth by the court in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention) should be applied since the expired claim are not subject to amendment. The statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. 282, has no application in reexamination (In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 225 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

That a claim term can have two different meanings in reexamination dependent on whether the patent is expired can be of utmost importance.  Application of a Phillips type claim construction can be useful in avoiding clarifying amendments.  Such amendments, if deemed substantive in a subsequent litigation, would surrender at least past damages based upon intervening rights.

Will the Central Reexamination Unit (“CRU”) apply the Phillips standard when interpreting claims of an expired patent?

Two unpublished and non-precedential decisions by different panels of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference (“Board”) shed some light on that question.  In Ex parte Personalized Media Communications, Inc., Appeals 2007-4044 and 2008-0334, Reexamination Control Nos. 90/006,697, 90/006,841, and 90/006,800 (BPAI, 2008), a panel of the Board concluded that claim language of an expired patent can be construed more narrowly than its ordinary and customary meaning only to the extent needed to resolve an ambiguity.  If the claim term is clear, the panel concluded that the broad reasonable standard generally applied by the U.S.P.T.O should be used.  See also Ex parte Peng Tan, Appeal 2006-3235, Reexamination Control No. 90/006,696 (BPAI, 2008)(affirmed by the Fed. Cir.).

What should be the burden of proof standard in such circumstances?  Since claims of an expired patent in reexamination cannot be amended and thus enjoy a district court (i.e., Phillips) type of claim construction, should the CRU be required to make a clear and convincing rather than preponderance of the evidence showing when rejecting a claim of an expired patent in reexamination?  Cf. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 225 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1985) where the  Federal Circuit concluded that the statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282, has no application in reexamination.

Curiously, however, the court in Etter relies upon the ability of patentees to amend claims in reexamination as justification to disregard the statutory presumption of validity provided by 35 U.S.C. § 282.   Is Etter controlling law regarding the proper treatment accorded expired patents for claim interpretation purposes in reexamination?

Consider Etter (225 USPQ at 8) in this respect:

In litigation, where a patentee cannot amend his claims, or add new claims, the presumption, and the rule of claim construction (claims shall be construed to save them if possible), have important roles to play. In reexamination, where claims can be amended and new claims added, and where no litigating adversary is present, those roles and their rationale simply vanish.

As Etter clearly predated inter partes reexamination, and did not consider expired patents, this is an issue worth watching.  Practitioners should be well advised to consider these important distinctions when representing the patent owner in reexamination proceedings involving expired patents.