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Amendment of § 256 Removed Previous Prohibition on Deceptive Intent

With the AIA, Congress amended § 256 to remove the requirement that the “error” of omitting an inventor from a patent must occur without “deceptive intention.”  That is not to say that such a deceptive intention would be free from an inequitable conduct charge, but, at least for purposes of the administrative correction, intent is no longer a consideration of the agency.

Few cases have explored the impact of this amendment, until Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc, which held the correction —and unraveling of the same correction —is not prevented by the amended statute.
Continue Reading AIA Change Allows for Deceptive Patent Corrections

Terminal Disclaimer Permanent Once Patent Issues

Back in January of 2011 I discussed the appeal decision in Ex parte Shunpei Yamazaki relative to patent reissue practice. In Yamazaki, a reissue patent application was filed shortly after issuance of U.S. Patent 6,180,991 for the purpose of withdrawing an earlier filed terminal disclaimer.

By way of background, the ‘991 patent issued on January 30, 2001 (based upon an application filed April 21, 1995). During the original prosecution, a terminal disclaimer was filed (November of 1996) to overcome a double patenting rejection. Thereafter, the claims subject to the earlier double patenting rejections were amended. Since the amended claims were believed to be distinct from those of the earlier patent, the Applicant petitioned to withdraw the earlier filed terminal disclaimer (April 1999). The petition remained pending for some 20+ months at the USPTO, but, the patent issued prior to any USPTO action on the petition filing. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot once the ‘991 Patent issued.

Adding insult to injury, the USPTO explained in their belated petition decision that a terminal disclaimer could not be removed once a patent issues as patent reissue did not contemplate such mistakes as “error” under the reissue statute. In other words, even though the patent holder had disclaimed some 14 years of patent term by mistake, there was no mechanism to cure that mistake post issuance. Nevertheless, the Patentee filed a patent reissue application in an attempt to withdraw the terminal disclaimer.

In deciding the propriety of a patent reissue proceeding to remove a terminal disclaimer, an expanded panel of the BPAI (now PTAB) held that patent reissue could not reset the term of the original patent (which was set by the disclaimer). Interestingly, the BPAI decision also included concurring opinions that would have held differently had the patent not expired prior to completion of the reissue proceeding (December 2003).

Last week, the CAFC affirmed the USPTO, and made clear that patent reissue cannot withdraw a terminal disclaimer, even if the reissue proceeding were capable of concluding prior to expiration.
Continue Reading Patent Reissue Cannot Cure Mistaken Terminal Disclaimer

USPTO Updates Patent Reissue Practice to be Consistent with In re Tanaka

The USPTO has now issued a Notice entitled “Clarification of Criteria for Reissue Error in View of In re Tanaka.”

As a reminder, Ex parte Tanaka was decided in December of 2009 by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). In their decision, the Board explained that a reissue application was improper where the only defect identified in an issued patent was the failure to present additional dependent claims.  The Board reasoned that the mere addition of new dependent claims did not identify any defect in the issued patent. The Board rejected the reasoning of In re Handel, which indicated that a failure to pursue dependent claims was an appropriate error in patent reissue. The Board characterized this reasoning as “dicta.”

The Board’s decision was reversed by the CAFC (In re Tanaka here). In their reversal, the CAFC explained that contrary to the Board’s position, the In re Handel dicta is consistent with the patent reissue statute, and the court has not departed from this line of reasoning over the years.

In order to account for the decision of the CAFC, the USPTO Notice provides:…

Continue Reading USPTO Changes Patent Reissue Practice

Oath Addressing Only New Claims Acceptable

Last week the BPAI considered an application for patent reissue (U.S. Patent 5,819,034) Ex Parte Kuiacose Joseph et al. The appeal considered the propriety of an oath in a patent reissue that did not identify a mistake in the original claims. A similar question was recently explored at the CAFC (In re Tanaka) relative to new, dependent claims.

In the application for patent reissue the original claims were cancelled in favor of new claims directed to a different invention. The cancelled, original claims were presented in a divisional patent application (now suspended pending the reissue). The Examiner found the reissue oath, which was directed to new method claims, defective since it did not identify an error in the original claims. The originally issued claims were directed to a system.

In other words, consistent with the USPTO’s Tanaka argument, the Examiner took the position that the oath was defective as not identifying any defect in the issued patent. The BPAI disagreed with the examiner.…

Continue Reading BPAI Considers Patent Reissue Oath Directed Only to New Claims

In Re Tanaka Decision on “Bullet Claims” Reversed at CAFCToday, the CAFC has held that the addition of narrower, dependent claims in patent reissue is an “error” contemplated by the patent reissue statute. In re Tanaka (CAFC 2011) (here)As a reminder, Ex parte Tanaka was decided in December of 2009 by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). In their holding, the Board explained that a reissue application was improper where the only defect identified in an issued patent was the failure to present additional dependent claims.  The Board reasoned that the mere addition of new dependent claims did not identify any defect in the issued patent. In their decision, the Board rejected the reasoning of In re Handel, which indicated that a failure to pursue dependent claims was an appropriate error in patent reissue. The Board characterized this reasoning as “dicta.”The Board’s decision was reversed today by the CAFC. In their reversal, the court explains that contrary to the Board’s position, the In re Handel dicta is consistent with the patent reissue statute, and the court has not departed from this line of reasoning over the years.In their decision to reverse the Board, the court explained:As interpreted by this court, the reissue statute imposes two requirements for properly invoking the reissue process. First, the original patent must be “wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Second, “the defective, inoperative, or invalid patent” must have arisen “through error without deceptive intent.” Id. at 1565. There is no dispute in this case that any defect arose without deceptive intent. . . . Judge Giles S. Rich wrote the Handel decision reversing the Board’s rejection of the reissue application. He explained that the reissue claims involved subject matter disclosed in the specification and thus were properly directed to “the invention disclosed in the original patent.” Id. at 944. In a footnote, Judge Rich remarked that “[t]he term ‘inoperative’ has been construed to mean inoperative adequately to protect the invention, which may be due to failure of the solicitor to understand the invention.” Id. at 945 n.2 (quoting McGrady, Patent Office Practice 309 (4th ed. 1959)). Judge Rich added that because the original patent claims were all retained in the reissue application the “term ‘less’ [in Handel’s reissue declaration] appears to have been used in the sense of fewer claims than he could properly have made, rather than in the statutory sense of subject matter included within the claims.” Id. at 946 n.2 (emphasis in original). Thus “[t]he narrower appealed claims are simply a hedge against possible invalidity of the original claims should the prior use be proved, which is a proper reason for asking that a reissue be granted.” Id. While this court has since characterized that view as dictum, it has not departed from it. . . . Even though the rule that adding a dependent claim as a hedge against possible invalidity is a proper reason to seek reissue has seemingly never been formally embodied in a holding of this court or its predecessor, articulation of the rule in Handel was not simply a passing observa-tion—it was a considered explanation of the scope of the reissue authority of the PTO in the context of a detailed explanation of the reissue statute. Based on this court’s adoption of that rule and its adherence to the rule in both Muller and Hewlett-Packard, this court rejects the Board’s contrary ruling.In the dissent, Judge Dyk explains that where all the original claims are still present in the patent reissue proceeding, the addition of narrower dependent claims is a surrender of nothing (i.e., statute requires surrender of original patent). He also notes that the cases relied upon by the majority are distinguishable on their facts.In essence Judge Dyk seems to be saying that where a patent reissue application seeks only new, dependent claims, it is essentially a continuation application by proxy. I think the USPTO would agree. Certainly, the anti-continuation lobby present at the USPTO back in 2008-2009 spawned quite a few initiatives to combat continuation filings. Today’s decision is a very positive development for Patente

Today, the CAFC has held that the addition of narrower, dependent claims in patent reissue is an “error” contemplated by the patent reissue statute. In re Tanaka (CAFC 2011) (here)

As a reminder, Ex parte Tanaka was decided in December of 2009 by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). In their holding, the Board explained that a reissue application was improper where the only defect identified in an issued patent was the failure to present additional dependent claims.  The Board reasoned that the mere addition of new dependent claims did not identify any defect in the issued patent. In their decision, the Board rejected the reasoning of In re Handel, which indicated that a failure to pursue dependent claims was an appropriate error in patent reissue. The Board characterized this reasoning as “dicta.”

The Board’s decision was reversed today by the CAFC. In their reversal, the court explains that contrary to the Board’s position, the In re Handel dicta is consistent with the patent reissue statute, and the court has not departed from this line of reasoning over the years.…

Continue Reading CAFC Reverses USPTO on Important Question of Patent Reissue

Expanded BPAI Panel Explains Acquiescence to Restriction Requirement is Not a Correctable ErrorAs provided by 35 U.S.C. § 251, Patent Reissue is a mechanism by which a patent owner may correct an error in an issued patent. A proper reissue application is directed to an error that was made without deceptive intent that renders an issued patent wholly, or partly, inoperative.Although patent reissue allows for the correction of mistakes in claim scope, the proceeding is not a “do-over” of the original prosecution. For example, claim scope previously surrendered may not be “recaptured” via a broadening patent reissue. This same reasoning is also utilized in another under appreciated aspect of reissue application practice, namely the pursuit of non-elected claims. When claims are restricted during original prosecution of the underlying patent application, and those claims are not pursued in a divisional application, such claims cannot be obtained by patent reissue. (very limited exceptions for linking claims in a genus/species sense). This prohibition is known as the “Orita Doctrine,” was applied yesterday in ex parte Goto et al. In Goto, the applicant failed to pursue certain non-elected inventions during prosecution of the original patent application. In a patent reissue application filed thereafter, the applicant pursued substantially similar claims. As explained by the BPAI:The “Orita doctrine” precludes applicants from obtaining by reissue claims which, because of a requirement for restriction in which they had acquiesced, they could not claim in their patent. In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280 (CCPA 1977). When applicants acquiesce in the examiner’s requirement for restriction, such action manifestly is not “error” causing patentee to claim “less than he had a right to claim in the patent” in the language of 35 U.S.C. § 251. Id, 550 F.2d at 1280.  The so-called Orita doctrine precludes reissue applicants from obtaining substantially identical claims to those of non-elected groups identified in an examiner’s restriction requirement when such claims could not have been prosecuted in the application from which they were restricted. In re Doyle, 293 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)In Goto, the original, restricted claims were directed to an inket recording head. In the reissue, the claims were written to emphasize a board member of the recording head. As show in at pages 10-11 of the BPAI decision, the claims were substantially similar in scope, albeit directed to different products. (the reissue claims also recited means-plus-function features to provide further points of distinction, to no avail).With this decision, practitioners are reminded that patent reissue is a tool to correct mistakes of an issued patent, not a tool to resurrect restricted claims of the original prosecution.

As provided by 35 U.S.C. § 251, Patent Reissue is a mechanism by which a patent owner may correct an error in an issued patent. A proper reissue application is directed to an error that was made without deceptive intent that renders an issued patent wholly, or partly, inoperative.

Although patent reissue allows for the correction of mistakes in claim scope, the proceeding is not a “do-over” of the original prosecution. For example, claim scope previously surrendered may not be “recaptured” via a broadening patent reissue. This same reasoning is also utilized in another under appreciated aspect of reissue application practice, namely the pursuit of non-elected claims. When claims are restricted during original prosecution of the underlying patent application, and those claims are not pursued in a divisional application, such claims cannot be obtained by patent reissue. (very limited exceptions for linking claims in a genus/species sense). This prohibition is known as the “Orita Doctrine,” was applied yesterday in ex parte Goto et al.…

Continue Reading Orita Doctrine Blocks Patent Reissue

Expanded BPAI Panel Divided on Proper Reissue PracticeThe proper interpretation of the patent reissue statutes was explored rather frequently at the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (BPAI) in 2010. Several important BPAI decision relating to patent reissue, In re Tanaka, In re Staats, and In re Mostafazadeh are now on appeal to the CAFC. As we begin 2011, the trend appears to be continuing.Last week, the Board considered the following two questions in Ex parte Shunpei Yamazaki (here), namely:1.  Does 35 U.S.C. § 251 authorize the Office to reissue a patent that has expired based on an expiration date set at the time of issuance of the original patent?2. Does 35 U.S.C. § 251 authorize the Office to expand in reissue the term of a patent beyond the term of the original patent set at the time of issuance?By way of background, Semiconductor Energy Laboratory, sought to reissue their U.S. Patent 6,180,991. This patent issued on January 30, 2001 based upon an application filed April 21, 1995. During the original prosecution, a terminal disclaimer was filed (November of 1996) to overcome a double patenting rejection. Thereafter, the claims subject to the earlier double patenting rejections were amended. As a result, the Applicant petitioned to withdraw the earlier filed disclaimer (April 1999).The petition remained pending at the USPTO for some time, roughly a year. At that point, a Notice of Allowance was issued and the issue fee paid by the Applicant. In the 21st month, (May 2001) the petition was dismissed as mooted by the issuance of the ‘991 Patent. In the petition decision, the Office explained that a terminal disclaimer cannot be removed once a patent issues, and also explained that patent reissue could not remedy the problem. As it stood, the Patent holder had mistakenly disclaimed some 14 years of patent term (based on a pre-GATT priority claim).Perhaps encouraged by a non-precedential Board decision, Ex parte Durckheimer (1996), and despite the caution of the Office that reissue practice could not remove the disclaimer, an application seeking reissue of the ‘991 Patent was filed on January 16, 2002.As is all too common with patent reissues applications, the case languished for some 9 years before reaching the Board for decision.In their decision, the majority answered both questions above in the negative, reasoning:We take this opportunity to resolve a conflict within the Office as to the meaning of “the term of the original patent” in 35 U.S.C. § 251 and whether the Office is authorized by this statute to remove a terminal disclaimer during reissue resulting in an expansion of the term of the original patent set at issuance.We interpret “the term of the original patent” in § 251 to refer to the “term” of the patent as the term set upon issuance of the original patent.  . . . . See Merck & Co., 482 F.3d at 1319; see also Bayer AG, 298 F.3d at 1381. Thus, we disagree with the Board’s earlier holding in Durckheimer that a terminal disclaimer does not alter “the term of the original patent.” . . . .As such, we feel that the prior panel’s interpretation of § 251 in Durckheimer was in error, and the present decision overrules Durckheimer. We adopt the position of the Office as stated in MPEP § 1490 that “[s]ince the granting of a reissue patent without the effect of a recorded terminal disclaimer would result in extending the term of the original patent, reissue under these circumstances would be contrary to the statute.”Consequently, at the time of issuance of Appellant’s patent on January 30, 2001, the statute recognized that the term of the ‘991 patent would expire on December 22, 2003, the expiration date specified in the Terminal Disclaimer. Section 251 does not permit the Office to now reissue the ‘991 patent beyond that term as set upon issuance. (internal footnotes omitted)However, the concurrence saw the issues raised by the Appellant a bit differently. The concurring APJ’s found that it is possible to reissue a patent for purposes of removing a terminal disclaimer, but that reissue must occur before expiration.The majority points to the language in § 251 which states that a patent may be reissued “for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent” (emphasis added). According to the majority, the term of a patent is set at the time of issuance and withdrawing a recorded terminal disclaimer in an issued patent would extend the term of that patent contrary to § 251.The “term” of a patent is set by statute at the time of issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2010). However, as explained in Ex parte Durckheimer, No. 94-2004, slip op. at 19 (BPAI 1996), a terminal disclaimer does not alter the “term” of the original patent. Rather, a terminal disclaimer disclaims a “terminal part of the term . . . of the patent granted or to be granted” thereby resetting the expiration date of that patent. 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2010).The majority appears to equate “term” with “expiration date.” However, I respectfully disagree that these terms are synonymous in this case where a terminal disclaimer has been recorded in an issued patent. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., Inc., 482 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing the expiration date resulting from the terminal disclaimer and the expiration date of the patent in the absence of the terminal disclaimer). . . .As [to expiration] . . . . The Appellant’s patent expired on December 22, 2003, by virtue of the terminal disclaimer that remains in effect. Therefore, the Office does not have the authority to reissue the Appellant’s patent for “the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.” (internal footnotes omitted)As pointed out in the concurring opinion, a terminal disclaimer is just that, a disclaimer of term otherwise accorded an issuing patent.Of course, once a patent is expired there can be no “re-issuing” the patent for an unexpired term. Yet, here the error identified in the application for reissue is one of term, seasonably presented before expiration. It seems grossly unfair to punish the Appellant in view of the significant delays in patent reissue prosecution, not to mention the egregious petition delay in the original prosecution.Perhaps this patent reissue dispute, much like the 2010 cases that came before it, is also destined for CAFC revi

The proper interpretation of the patent reissue statutes was explored rather frequently at the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (BPAI) in 2010. Several important BPAI decision relating to patent reissue, In re Tanaka, In re Staats, and In re Mostafazadeh are now on appeal to the CAFC. As we begin 2011, the trend appears to be continuing.

Last week, the Board considered the following two questions in Ex parte Shunpei Yamazaki (here), namely:

1.  Does 35 U.S.C. § 251 authorize the Office to reissue a patent that has expired based on an expiration date set at the time of issuance of the original patent?

2. Does 35 U.S.C. § 251 authorize the Office to expand in reissue the term of a patent beyond the term of the original patent set at the time of issuance?
Continue Reading Removing Terminal Disclaimers by Patent Reissue

roadblockass=”alignleft size-full wp-image-3880″ title=”roadblock” src=”https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/roadblock.jpg” alt=”roadblock” width=”203″ height=”144″ />This past Monday the BPAI pointed out that a Patent Holder may not swear behind a patent that claims the same invention, the proper forum for such a priority contest being a patent interference proceeding. The decision, Ex parte Regents of the University of California (“Regents”) (decision here), affirmed-in-part the rejection of U.S. patent No. 5,916,912 in ex parte reexamination.  In particular, the Board held that Regents could not antedate U.S. Patent No. 5,998,474 (“Cavazza”) because the ‘912 patent and Cavazza were claiming the same patentable invention. Applying, 37 C.F.R. 41.203(a), the Board reasoned that the two patents were directed to “the same patentable invention” since a claim of the Regents patent is obvious in view of a claim of Cavazza, and vice versa. This leaves the Regents in a bind, aside from challenging the BPAI decision to the CAFC, how can an interfering patent applied in patent reexamination be overcome?
Continue Reading What to do with an Interfering Patent in Patent Reexamination?

OopsSection 17 of the March 5, 2010 version of S. 515 (the Patent Reform Act of 2010) makes certain curious changes to Sections 116 (Joint Inventions), 184 (Filing in a Foreign Country), 185 (Foreign Filing Without a License), 251 (Reissue of Defective Patents), and 253 (Disclaimer) that would eliminate the “without deceptive intent” eligibility proscription.  The effect of these changes would be to eliminate the prohibition against gaining access to these statutory provisions where the applicant had committed fraud on the Patent Office.

If these so called technical amendments were enacted into law applicants could  add or delete named inventors to correct an error in inventorship that was made with deceptive intent.  That is, even where the applicants filed the patent application with the deceptive intent to exclude an inventor,
Continue Reading Does Patent Reform Go Too Far in Eliminating Inequitable Conduct?

updateass=”alignleft size-full wp-image-1458″ title=”update” src=”https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/update.jpg” alt=”update” width=”132″ height=”127″ />Last week we noted the potential affect of Ex Parte Tanaka internal to the USPTO.  Tanaka was decided last December by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), holding that a reissue application was improper where the only defect identified in an issued patent was the…