220px-Wingmanass=”alignleft size-full wp-image-4165″ title=”220px-Wingman” src=”https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/220px-Wingman.jpg” alt=”220px-Wingman” width=”220″ height=”177″ />Whether in a social or tactical environment, everyone knows the importance of a good wingman.  Yet, the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences (“BPAI”) has suffered from the absence of its wingman in several recent appeals to the Federal Circuit.

In Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Technologies Corp. (here), the Federal Circuit applied a non-traditional test in its interference-in-fact analysis, and in Agilent Technologies Inc. v. Affymetrix Inc. (see past blog post here), the court imposed a very controversial claim interpretation standard for copied claims.  In a rare form of collateral damage, the Agilent decision led the BPAI to rescind one of its fundamental rules, 37 C.F.R. 41.200(b).

Would Solicitor participation in these cases have protected the institutional interests of the BPAI?  The answer is not clear.  However, absent Solicitor participation, the BPAI’s record will be left to speak for itself. Continue Reading No Interference from USPTO Solicitors at the CAFC?

Cancelled -- Rule 41.200(b)ass=”size-full wp-image-2162 alignleft” title=”cancelled” src=”https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/cancelled.gif” alt=”Cancelled — Rule 41.200(b)” width=”172″ height=”129″ /> The USPTO has announced that 37 C.F.R. 41.200(b) is no longer viable in light of the  Federal Circuit’s Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix[1] decision, and has thus cancelled the rule.  As discussed in earlier posts commenting on the Agilent and Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v. Cardiac Science Operating Company[2] decisions, the Federal Circuit has concluded that, when a party challenges the patentability of a “copied” claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the “copied” claim should be interpreted in light of the specification of the targeted patent or application.  In contrast, Rule 41.200(b) required that a claim in interference be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification in which it appears. With Rule 41.200(b) taken out of its misery, one has to wonder what guidance examiners will be given when examining claims “copied” to provoke an interference.  Will examiners be instructed to apply one claim construction when considering written description and another claim construction when applying prior art to the same “copied” claims?  Will the MPEP be updated?  If nothing else, the PTO’s decision to cancel Rule 41.200(b) in response to Agilent reinforces the prevailing opinion that interference practice is arcane. 


[1] 567 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). [2] 590 F3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

In an earlier post, we inquired whether patent claims at the PTO are treated like a “nose of wax.”  Generally, a claim examined by the PTO is given its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the specification of the application or patent in which it appears.  One notable exception to the general rule arises in interferences where an applicant “copies” the claim of a targeted patent or application to provoke the interference.  In this case, if a party challenges the patentability of the “copied” claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the “copied” claim is interpreted in light of the specification of the targeted patent or applicationSee Agilent v. Affymetrix, 567 F.3d 1366, 91 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   A request for an en banc rehearing of the Agilent panel decision was denied by the Federal Circuit.  In Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”) v. Cardiac Science Operating Company (“Cardiac Science”) (Fed. Cir. case No. 2009-1241), a second panel of the Federal Circuit has maintained that, when a party challenges the patentability of a “copied” claim Continue Reading “Nose of Wax” Revisited and Should 35 USC § 145 be Revised to Apply to Reexaminations?