Duty of Disclosure

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Egregious Misconduct Claim Shot Down by District Court

As most patent reexaminations are conducted in parallel to a related litigation, it is important that the USPTO be informed of the progress of a parallel litigation. For this reason, MPEP 2282; 2686 permit the filing of litigation notices by any party to the proceeding, or even a member of the public. The simple failure to inform the USPTO of a parallel court proceeding had, prior to Therasense, been held to be per se material under the former “reasonable examiner” standard. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

But what about an arbitration proceeding, does the same duty apply? …and, does the heightened Therasense standard disturb the earlier Nilssen ruling?…

Continue Reading Arbitration Materials Witheld From USPTO Reexamination

USPTO Post Grant Consideration Precludes “But For” Materiality

The en banc CAFC decision in Therasense has recalibrated inequitable conduct jurisprudence. The decision effectively tightened the standard that is applied in judging materiality of information underlying an inequitable conduct defense. More specifically, the Court replaced the previous “reasonable examiner” standard with a new “but for” materiality analysis. The “but for” standard defines material information as any non-cumulative information which, had it been disclosed prior to patent issuance, would have prevented the patent from issuing.

As I discussed prior to the issuance of the Therasense decision, a “but for” materiality standard applies in Walker Process antitrust claims. Earlier this year, in U.S. Rubber Recycling, Inc. v. ECORE International Inc., et al.(CDCA), the California District Court considered whether or not prior art materials could satisfy a “but for” materiality standard where the USPTO had considered the very same information in a patent reissue proceeding, and had still reissued the patent. In deciding that this information could not be material as a matter of law, the Court explained that while a USPTO proceeding cannot cure fraudulent conduct, it can be dispositive of a “but for” materiality standard and that “[b]ecause the PTO reexamines re-issuance applications as if being presented for the first time, the fact that the PTO did re-issue Defendant’s patent even with the prior art precludes Plaintiff from plausibly pleading [Walker Process].[1]

Since the court’s initial ruling on the Walker process claim, the Therasense decision issued.  Last week, the Court considered the applicability of the same art under an inequitable conduct theory.
Continue Reading Therasense Drives Summary Judgment Victory for Reissue Patentee

New Therasense Guidelines to Invite Extrinsic Evidence Abuse?

As discussed yesterday, the USPTO has proposed to modify asepcts of Rule 1.56(b) and Rule 1.555(b) to comport to the materiality standard of the recent Therasense decision of the CAFC. In doing so, the Office has proposed a definition of “but for-plus” materiality standard defined by acts of omission (duty of disclosure) together with affirmative acts relating to willful false statements and misrepresentations (duty of candor and good faith).

Rule 56 is an ethical guidepost that pertains only to Patent Applicants. As such, aside from a rare protest under Rule 1.291 or 1.99, third parties do not submit prior art materials to the USPTO under this Rule (of course patent reform will provide more opportunities for pre-grant submissions). Instead, Rule 56 compliance is litigated as an element of an inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement. Charges of inequitable conduct are not substantively considered in patent reexamination as the Office is a less than ideal arbiter of questions of “intent.” 

Currently, the USPTO is proposing to define, by Rule, a materiality standard in terms of “bad acts.” Consequently, has the USPTO now undermined established practice (MPEP) by encouraging new 1.555(b)(2) submissions for consideration of such information in patent reexamination?
Continue Reading SNQ Plus – A New Game for Patent Reexamination

Rule 56

USPTO’s Rule 56 “But For-Plus” Proposal

Last week, the USPTO published proposed changes to the materiality standard of  37 CFR §§ 1.56 and 1.555 in response to the Federal Circuit en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.

Impressively, the USPTO has managed to publish the proposed changes in just under two months (since the issuance of the Therasense decision). The initiative to craft such meaningful proposals in such a short time period, as well as the intention to help alleviate the significant duty of disclosure obligations is certainly greatly appreciated by all stakeholders.

In distilling the essence of Therasense down to succinct language for rule making purposes, the USPTO has promulgated a “but for-plus” test.

Is this test appropriate as currently presented, or does it require a bit more seasoning? 
Continue Reading Mixing the Duty of Candor with the Duty of Disclosure

Texas Court Likens Issuance of Continuation Patents During Litigation to Patent ReexaminationAs discussed yesterday, willful infringement exists where an accused infringer acted “despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In assessing the propriety of a post-filing willfulness allegation (i.e., after the  complaint is filed with the court) Seagate is oft cited for the proposition that a plaintiff must seek injunctive relief (i.e., preliminary injunction). However, court’s have refused to impose such a wooden rule. Instead, court’s look to the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the existence of concluded patent reexaminations.In other words, where a patent survives patent reexamination, conduct of a defendant after issuance of the reexamination certificate may be deemed reckless. Ultratech Int’l, Inc. v. Aqua-Leisure Indus., Inc. v. Swimways Corp., No. 3:05-cv-134-J-25MCR, 2009 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2009); See also St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Palm, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49922, at *5-6 (D. Del. Jun. 10, 2009).Last week, in denying a defendant summary judgment motion of no willful infringement, Judge Ward of the Eastern District of Texas extended the patent reexamination rationale noted above to newly issued continuation patents. In essence, Judge Ward explained that the prior art applied in the litigation for invalidity purposes had already been laundered by the USPTO during prosecution of the continuation patent applications. In SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc., et al. (EDTX), Judge Ward reasoned:In St. Clair, a patent holder’s post-filing willfulness allegation was permitted in spite of Seagate after the patent exited reexamination without substantially narrowed claims. SynQor’s position with the [newly issued continuation applications] is similar to St. Clair’s position with its reexamined patents. Prior to issuance of the [continuation applications as patents], SynQor had been engaged in litigation with defendants for 20 months. Any relevant prior art relied upon by Defendants must have been produced to SynQor approximately one year before the issuance of either patent. [by court order] SynQor, in turn, had a duty of candor to the USPTO to produce any prior art references material to patentability under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) in its prosecution of the applications that issued as the [new patents]. Thus, at least as to art that was disclosed, Defendants’ invalidity defenses have been tested and found lacking by the PTO. The issuance of the [new patents] over Defendants’ asserted prior art creates an objectively high likelihood that the [new patents] are valid over that prior art, similar to the result of the reexamination in St. Clair. As a result, a preliminary injunction was not necessary for SynQor to assert post-filing willful infringement of the [newly issued patents]. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment of no willful infringement of [the newly issued patents] is DENIED.Interestingly both patents (7,558,803 & 7,564,702) subject to the Summary Judgment Motion are now being reexamined at the USPTO based in part, on art that was submitted during original prosecution. (inter partes patent reexamination Control Nos 95/001,405 and 95/001,406). However, it appears that the grant of these reexaminations was in October of 2010, perhaps too late for the summary judgment briefing. The patents issued in July of 2009, it is unclear why the defendants waited a year to initiate reexamination proceedings.This case was brought to my attention by the great Docket Navigator.

As discussed yesterday, willful infringement exists where an accused infringer acted “despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In assessing the propriety of a post-filing willfulness allegation (i.e., after the  complaint is filed with the court) Seagate is oft cited for the proposition that a plaintiff must seek injunctive relief (i.e., preliminary injunction). However, court’s have refused to impose such a wooden rule. Instead, court’s look to the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the existence of concluded patent reexaminations.

In other words, where a patent survives patent reexamination, conduct of a defendant after issuance of the reexamination certificate may be deemed reckless. Ultratech Int’l, Inc. v. Aqua-Leisure Indus., Inc. v. Swimways Corp., No. 3:05-cv-134-J-25MCR, 2009 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2009); See also St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. Palm, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49922, at *5-6 (D. Del. Jun. 10, 2009).

Last week, in denying a defendant summary judgment motion of no willful infringement, Judge Ward of the Eastern District of Texas extended the patent reexamination rationale noted above to newly issued continuation patents. In essence, Judge Ward explained that the prior art applied in the litigation for invalidity purposes had already been laundered by the USPTO during prosecution of the continuation patent applications. …
Continue Reading Issuance of Continuation Patents During Litigation Undermine Defense to Willful Infringement

Paperwork

The Fruit of the Poisonous Inequitable Conduct Tree= Mammoth IDS Filings

Last week, I commented on a recent ruling in Bendix Commercial Vehicle Systems LLC, et al v. Haldex Brake Products Corp., 1-09-cv-00176 (N.D.O.H) relating to patent resissue/recapture. In addition to the interesting recapture issues presented, this case also demonstrates why the USPTO must be continually burdened with mammoth IDS filings in post-grant proceedings.

Last week a further ruling was issued in this case on a summary judgment motion. Plaintiff Bendix requested summary judgment of NO inequitable conduct based on a multitude of defendant accusations relating to the plaintiff’s conduct during the patent reissue proceeding. Despite the plaintiff’s disclosure of litigation materials, expert reports etc, as well as the defendant filing their own carefully worded protest in the patent reissue proceeding, the defendant pointed to a single sentence of a deposition as being withheld from the USPTO….I couldn’t make this up.
Continue Reading Large Patent Reissue/Reexamination IDS Filings Driven By Inequitable Conduct Plague

keyAs noted by USPTO reexamination statistics, the majority of recent patent reexaminations are also involved in concurrent litigation.  A recurring issue for litigants involved in such disputes is the fashioning of an appropriate protective order to adequately protect confidential materials. Such issues become particularly contentious in litigation between direct competitors.

Understandably, defendants typically seek protective orders providing  maximum protection of confidential materials, forbidding litigation counsel from using these materials in the prosecution of plaintiff’s patent applications. This prohibition known as a “patent prosecution bar,” is largely standard practice.  However, it is well established that patent reexamination does not involve “patent applications.” Thus, a thornier issue is presented when attempting to extend this bar to include barring participation by individuals with access to confidential information in ongoing reexamination proceedings.

Courts have taken divergent paths on the issue.  Some courts
Continue Reading Protective Orders: Patent Reexamination & Concurrent Litigation in Delaware

Patent owners face a dilemma when they are involved in reexamination proceedings with concurrent patent litigation. They may become aware of potentially material information during litigation that is covered by a protective order. Yet they have a duty to the USPTO to disclose information known to be material regardless of the source of such information.…

–Third Party Tactics in Reexamination —

Part II of our discussion on 2282/2686  Previously, we analyzed Patent Owner compliance with MPEP 2282/2686 in patent reexamination in the wake of Larson Manufacturing Co. of South Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Products (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Specifically, the previous post explored the Patent Owner’s duty to notify the Office of concurrent proceedings (2282 for ex parte, 2686 for inter partes).   In this installment, we explore MPEP 2282/2686 relative to the duty to notify the Office of external proceedings, such as a district court litigation involving the patent at issue.   For example, 2282 provides:  Ordinarily, no submissions of any kind by third parties filed after the date of the order are entered into the reexamination or patent file while the reexamination proceeding is pending. However, in order to ensure a complete file, with updated status information regarding prior or concurrent proceedings regarding the patent under reexamination, the Office will, at any time, accept from any parties, for entry into the reexamination file, copies of notices of suits and other proceedings involving the patent and copies of decisions or papers filed in the court from litigations or other proceedings involving the patent. (emphasis added) The lack of ability to participate in an ongoing ex parte reexamination is deemed a significant drawback
Continue Reading The Evolution of MPEP 2282/2686