Patent Trial & Appeal Board

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315(e)(2) Estoppel Application Less Than Straightforward

IPR estoppel is established under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), which provides that “the petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” (emphasis added).  After Last year, in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Auomated Creel Systems, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016) the interpretation of “reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review” has been unnecessarily complicated.

Shaw had petitioned for a writ of mandamus instructing the PTO to institute IPR based on a ground the Board previously denied as redundant.  Id. at 1299.  To satisfy one of three requirements for such a writ, Shaw argued that it had no other adequate means to attain the desired relief because it had brought that ground before the PTO and thus may be estopped from arguing the ground in any future proceeding.  Id.  However, the Court found no reason for Shaw to fear estoppel, holding that “[t]he plain language of the statute prohibits the application of estoppel under these circumstances.”  Id. at 1300.  The Court’s logic was that an IPR does not “begin until it is instituted.”   Id.  According to the Court, under Section 315 and due to its term “during that inter partes review,” an IPR petitioner could not have raised (or have reasonably raised) any ground in a petition for which the PTAB did not institute trial.  Shaw’s proffered invalidity ground had been denied and thus never entered the IPR; therefore, Shaw would not be estopped from its new invalidity argument.  The take-away from Shaw is that Section 315(e) does not estop an IPR petitioner from challenging a patent based on petitioned but non-instituted grounds of unpatentability.

The legislative intent behind 315(e)(2) is quite the contrary.
Continue Reading PTAB Redundant Ground Practice Complicating Estoppel

Key Administrative Law Doctrine on the Congressional Chopping Block & Onerous Rule Hurdles

As pointed out in yesterday’s Top 5 PTAB Trial Developments of 2016, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is the constitution of Article I courts. In its 70 years of existence, the APA has never been modified. Yet, over time, common law developments have been intermingled with APA considerations — none more prominent than the “Chevron Doctrine.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This judge made doctrine stands for the proposition that where there is silence or ambiguity in a statute conveying agency authority or action, that courts should apply deference to reasonable agency interpretations. Critics of Chevron argue that it cannot be reconciled with the APA, and has led to a highly inconsistent body of case law.

Politicians argue that Chevron allows regulatory agencies to create law independent of judicial review, and leads to an unwarranted expansion of costly bureaucracy.

Today, the House will begin to consider HR. 5, which not only proposes to eliminate the Chevron Doctrine by amending the APA to expressly exclude it, but also proposes to heap a boatload of additional regulatory roadblocks to the promulgation of agency rules. …
Continue Reading Chevron Deference for AIA Trial Matters Trumped?

Moving Forward on Indefinite Claims Could Haunt Petitioners

Often times when preparing an Inter Partes Review (IPR) petition, a claim is encountered that may be of an indeterminate scope under 35 U.S.C. 112. As indefiniteness issues are not considered in IPR, the question then becomes: Should the broadest of the possible competing construction for the claim term be proposed in order to get an IPR instituted on the claim? Or, should the petitioner avoid proposing a construction for an indefinite term to reserve rights for a later, district court challenge?  Of course, holding back claims for a later district court proceeding is typically disfavored given the entire point of IPR, in most cases, is to avoid the expense of district court litigation.  For that reason, most petitioners forge ahead to attack the indefinite claim.

As explained by the Federal Circuit this week in Sonix Technology Co., Ltd. V. Pubs. Int’l Ltd. et al., (here), Petitioners would be wise to note the 112 issue in their petitions.

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Continue Reading What to Do With 112 Issues in IPR?

Bar to Appealing 315(b) Disputes Likely to be Overruled

Back in November, the Federal Circuit issued a non-precedential decision in the Click-To-Call Techs. v. Oracle Corp., which openly questioned the continued viability of Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) post-Cuozzo.  As a reminder, Achates held that issues arising under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (i.e,, IPR one year, time bar) could not be appealed to the CAFC, pursuant to 314(d).  

Today, in Wi-Fi One LLC v. Broadcom (here), the Court granted en banc review of the IPR appeal bar.

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Continue Reading CAFC Grants En Banc Review of IPR Appeal Bar

Fee Setting Authority to be Exercised in 2017 

The USPTO discussed its first ever fee increase under the fee setting authority of the America Invents Act (AIA) in November of 2015.  At the time, an initial proposal was provided to the Public Patent Advisory Committee (PPAC) for review.  While the hope was to have the proposed fee adjustments take effect on October 1, 2016 (start of FY 2017), significant stakeholder feedback and considerations have, understandably, slowed the rule making process.

Prior to the close of 2016, a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) issued requesting comments from the public on proposed fee increases for post-grant patent proceedings, including AIA trials.  With comments collected last month, a Final Rule Notice is imminent.  

Expected Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) fee increases include:

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Continue Reading PTAB Trials to Increase in Cost for 2017

Expert Agency Need Not Accept Expert Testimony

AIA trial practices of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) are often analogized to that of the district courts. Yet, in practice, there are more differences than similarities between the two. The PTAB, unlike the district courts, is an expert agency. For this reason, its decisions are reviewed on the substantial evidence standard of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 706. Further the PTAB applies the preponderance of the evidence evidentiary standard, which stands in stark contrast to the clear and convincing standard of the district court.  Taken together, these two foundational differences are worlds apart from district court trial practices, and, serve as the primary drivers behind the appeal of the PTAB to patent challengers.

Counsel more accustomed to the favorable patentee standards of the district courts, often times find themselves struggling with the seemingly bizarro world of PTAB administrative trials— such as the agency’s ability to disregard expert testimony that would be given weight in the district courts.
Continue Reading CAFC Explains PTAB Expertise & Its Role In IPR Fact Finding

CAFC Decision Faults 103 Analysis on Reviewability Grounds

Last week, in In re Nuvasive, the Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s Final Written Decision from IPR2013-0056 involving Medtronic, Inc and NuVasive, Inc. (“NuVasive”) and remanded the case “for additional findings and explanations regarding the PHOSITA’s motivation to combine the prior art references.”  (2015-1670, at 13 (Dec. 7, 2016)).

But this case isn’t so much about about the law of obviousness but the adequacy of the appellate record under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

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Continue Reading CAFC Faults IPR Record on APA Grounds

PTAB Specific Webinars Offered by USPTO

The full slate of 2017 Boardside Chat webinars have been announced for 2017. The BoardSide Chat series is a bi-monthly webinar that is free to the public. As with past webinars, the Board will share updates on topics related to ex parte appeals and AIA trials. There will be time during each webinar for audience questions and feedback.

Please see the schedule below:…
Continue Reading PTAB BoardSide Chats for 2017

Patent Examiners Leverage AIA Trial Data

Back in April, the USPTO launched the Post Grant Outcomes Pilot, which focused on pending patent applications that are related to patents undergoing an America Invents Act (AIA) trial proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The agency now reports that the Post Grant Outcomes Pilot has succeeded in making examiners aware of trials related to applications they are examining, and in turn has facilitated the timely and effective examination of applications.

The idea behind the program is that AIA trial proceedings contain prior art and arguments that might be highly relevant to the patentability determination of related applications currently under examination. This pilot was intended to help examiners harness the art presented during AIA trials to enhance examination of a related application, so they could reach more expeditious decisions on patentability.

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Continue Reading Related Applications & PTAB Trials: Post-Grant Pilot Results

“Incidental to” or “Complementary to” Financial Products/Services is Not Enough

Since 2012, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) has reined in its definition of a covered business method (CBM) patent under Section 18 of the AIA. In early CBM decisions, it was enough for the patent specification to reference some incidental or complimentary financial service aspect for the PTAB to find CBM eligibility. Since those early decisions, the PTAB has recalibrated its CBM eligibility analysis. Today, the Board increasingly seeks out claim language explicitly related to financial transactions/services. 

Yesterday, in Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., (here) the Federal Circuit had occasion to consider CBM eligibility in the context of one of those earlier PTAB decisions. In Unwired, the CAFC rejected the specification-based analysis, a decision that is sure to reverberate across pending CBM appeals of the same vintage now before the Federal Circuit.
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Continue Reading CAFC Defines Outer Boundaries of CBM Eligibility