Instituted Grounds Can be Supported with New Evidence Not Present in Petition/Institution Decision

Within the past week, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has issued two significant opinions on AIA trial practice—both of which explain the critical import of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). As discussed earlier this week, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3) prevents the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) from introducing new claim interpretation theories without notice, or opportunity to respond in SAS Institute Inc., v. ComplemenSoft LLC. On the heels of that decision comes perhaps an even more significant decision in Genzyme Therapeutic Products LP v. BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc.

In Genzyme, the Court dispelled a widely held belief held by many practitioners and PTAB judges alike.  Namely, that an AIA trial petition must function as a storehouse for all possible evidence and arguments.  In a plainly worded opinion the Federal Circuit found that “[t]he purpose of the trial in an inter partes review proceeding is to give the parties an opportunity to build a record by introducing evidence—not simply to weigh evidence of which the Board is already aware.” (emphasis added) (here)

Simply stated, this decision is an AIA trial practice game changer.
Continue Reading CAFC Makes Clear New Evidence During AIA Trials is Expected

Pre-Suit Opinion of Counsel/PTAB Challenge Critical to Avoiding Enhanced Damages

Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that, upon a finding of patent infringement, courts “may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” Up until this past Monday, the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC controlled  this determination, requiring patentees to show that an accused infringer’s actions were both objectively and subjectively reckless—both by clear and convincing evidence.

Needless to say, patentees rarely met these exacting burdens of proof.  

In most cases, accused infringers would raise ex post infringement defenses that raised “a substantial question as to the validity or non-infringement of the patent” to negate a finding of objective recklessness. In other words, even if the infringer was unaware of the colorable defense when infringement began, Seagate’s-objective prong could provide a get-out-of-jail free card if a colorable defense was later developed during trial. The ability to wait for a lawsuit was an especially cost effective tool for in-house counsel that hoped to avoid costly, proactive strategies such as procuring an opinion of counsel, or openly challenging the patent on at the PTAB.  That is, pre-suit, smoking gun evidence of infringement was readily negated by a proficient trial defense. 

The game has now changed—significantly—with the Supreme Court’s decision this week in Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs (here)
Continue Reading How The PTAB Can Maintain Your Willfulness Halo

Impact of Concluded PTAB Proceedings on Litigation

Patent challenge proceedings of the USPTO’s Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) are designed to provide a low cost, expedited option to district court litigation. Of course, if a patent challenger is unsuccessful at the PTAB, the district court is left to make the ultimate resolution on validity.  Now several years into the PTAB’s existence, closed AIA trial records are being leveraged by the courts to resolve disputed issues of fact.  

Especially as to matters of claim scope, the PTAB’s expansion of the intrinsic record is providing courts with a short cut in assessing otherwise thorny factual determinations. Accused infringers are beginning to favorably leverage this record in related litigation—such as in a motion for summary judgment.   


Continue Reading PTAB Trial Records Leveraged for Summary Judgement Wins

PTAB Moves to Establish More Precedential Decisions

Yesterday, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) announced the designation of five, additional precedential decisions.

Garmin Int’l v. Cuozzo Speed Techs LLC, IPR2012-00001, Paper 26 (Mar. 5, 2013) – This order discusses the factors considered in evaluating motions for additional discovery in IPR proceedings. Previously designated as informative, this decision has been treated as de facto precedent for quite some time.

Bloomberg, Inc. v. Markets-Alert Pty, Ltd., CBM2013-00005, Paper 32 (May 29, 2013) – This order discusses the factors considered in evaluating motions for additional discovery in CBM proceedings. (Garmin for CBMs)

Oracle Corp. v. Click-to-Call Techs, LP, IPR2013-00312, Paper 26 (October 30, 2013) (precedential only as to Section III.A.) – This decision pertains to interpretation of “served with a complaint” for purposes of triggering the one-year time bar set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  More specifically, this decision stands for the proposition that a dismissal of a prior law suit “without prejudice” prevents that suit from triggering the time bar of 315(b).  This has also been de facto precedent at the PTAB.
Continue Reading PTAB Designates Five Precedential Decisions

Vast Majority of Amendments Denied on the Merits

Yesterday the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) released a study on motions to amend. Contrary to popular belief, the majority of these motions are not denied on strict procedural grounds, but instead, on the merits.

The study points out that:

  • In the 1539 trials that have gone to completion or settled (where joined or consolidated trials were counted as a single trial), motions to amend were sought in a little over 10% of cases, 192 in all. (34 more motions to amend are pending in currently open cases.)
  • Of those 192, not all ultimately required the PTAB to pass on the merits of the motion. This is because, often, motions to amend are filed as “contingent” motions—if the PTAB upholds the patentability of the original claims, such motions never get decided. Several other cases settle before motions to amend are decided. Additionally, some motions to “amend” only request the cancellation of claims, and those are routinely granted.  
  • 94 of the 118 remaining petitions were denied on merit based deficiencies, only 22 were bounced on procedural grounds.


Continue Reading PTAB Releases Eye Opening Amendment Stats

New Evidentiary Opportunity Dissolves Patentee Criticism

Patentees have lamented the inability to submit new, testimonial evidence via preliminary response since the inception of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB). It was argued that since AIA trial petitions almost always included testimonial evidence, the inability to respond in kind was procedurally lopsided in favor of challengers.  Because of this perceived imbalance, patentees insisted that trial institution was a foregone conclusion.  Of course, if this patentee criticism were valid, far more trials would conclude favorably to patentees once such evidence is entered (it is permitted later, during trial).

Nevertheless, responsive to this criticism, the PTAB will begin allowing new testimonial evidence with preliminary responses on May 1st.  But, is this new patentee opportunity truly helpful?


Continue Reading Patentees Beware: New PTAB Evidentiary Option Might Not Help

TTAB Vacates Precedential Decision By Court Order….PTAB Decisions Next?

in 2013 the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board (TTAB) issued  a precedential decision in a trademark opposition between the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama et al v. William Pitts, Jr. & Christopher Blackburn. In the decision, the TTAB dismissed the opposition of the University against a mark for a logo with a houndstooth pattern with the words “Houndstooth Mafia” for use on T-shirts and hats. (The logo was seemingly inspired by the houndstooth fedora worn by the late Alabama football coach Paul “Bear” Bryant).  The opposition was dismissed as the TTAB determined that the University had no common law rights to a houndstooth pattern. (here)

Rather than appeal the TTAB decision to the Federal Circuit, the University opted to challenge the TTAB decision in a civil action under 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(1) — in the Northern District of Alabama.  Before that action progressed very far the parties settled, and via consent decree of the Court, agreed that the TTAB decision should be vacated.  More importantly, the consent decree made statements of fact that the houndstooth pattern had become distinctive, which could impact other ongoing TTAB oppositions of the University on the same issue.  The University motioned to vacate the TTAB decision based upon the consent decree (here).  In an expanded panel decision that included the Chief Judge of the TTAB, the motion was unanimously denied. The TTAB determined that a settlement of private parties should not impact a decision of the TTAB absent extraordinary circumstances; especially where precedential.

The Alabama judge strongly disagreed.  In a stinging memorandum, he ordered the TTAB to vacate its Order within 14 days. (here)
Continue Reading PTAB Vacatur By Court Order?

PPC Broadband Decision Volunteers Philips Claim Read in IPR Decision

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (PTAB) use of the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (BRI) standard is now slated for review by the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed v. Lee.  Opponents of the BRI standard, such as Cuozzo, argue that a “Philips” style claim construction is most appropriate for the PTAB because issued claims should be construed consistent with district court.  More importantly, Philips is considered to be a more patent friendly (i.e., narrower) interpretation. Yet, as I have pointed out before, the BRI and Philips frameworks are largely the same.  While the question posed to the Supreme Court in Cuozzo alleges a difference in the application of “plain and ordinary meaning,” this difference is readily disproven.

To the extent a difference can be delineated between PTAB and district court claim interpretation practices it is the perspective of the decision makers.  When applying Philips, courts will attempt to identify a “most reasonable” scope rather than the “broadest reasonable” scope.  While both selections require a reasonable outcome, and the constructions may lead to the same result in many cases, the “most reasonable” interpretation could include a selection between competing, reasonable constructions.  This selection is all too often driven by invalidity concerns. (despite the caution against such in the Philips decision itself)

Given that the PTAB has consistently maintained earlier BRI interpretations for patents that expired during review (requiring a switch to Philips) it is difficult to even identify a case where the PTAB’s proper application of Philips would move the needle.  Yesterday, the CAFC set out to provide such an example in PPC Broadband Inc., v. Corning Optical Communications RF, L.L.C.
Continue Reading CAFC May Have Amplified Need for BRI at PTAB

CAFC Makes Clear BRI Encompasses Plain & Ordinary Meaning

The USPTO’s Broadest Reasonable Interpretation (BRI) encompasses an assessment of the plain and ordinary meaning of a patent claim term.  As such, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Cuozzo Speed v. Lee to review the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (PTAB) application of BRI is puzzling. 

As a reminder, the Cuozzo petition presented its BRI question as follows:

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, in IPR proceedings, the Board may construe claims in an issued patent according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning.

Last week, in TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, the Federal Circuit explained that a BRI analysis necessarily includes an assessment of the plain and ordinary meaning, and that BRI is not an unfettered license to interpret claims without regard for the written description.


Continue Reading CAFC Undermines Cuozzo BRI Gripe