–Concurrent Litigation a Driving Force– The USPTO has released their year end statistics for ex parte and inter partes patent reexamination.  The ex parte statistics may be found here, the inter partes hereEx parte numbers are down slightly, it is not clear whether this modest decrease is a function of the overall 2009 economy, or a shift toward inter partes proceedings.  Perhaps tellingly, the inter partes numbers continue to increase at a strong pace year over year.  The statistics indicate that a whopping 68% of inter partes reexaminations are known to be in litigation (32% for ex parte). With the continued influx of inter partes reexaminations to the Office, one has to wonder how the USPTO will keep up with the demand.  Indeed, the Office is increasingly criticized with respect to the growing delays associated with inter partes reexamination.   Tomorrow we will explore how the behavior of inter partes requestors virtually ensures PTO inefficiency, and how such behavior may be discouraged to streamline the proceeding….stay tuned.

Courts have recently been faced with the issue of whether evidence of parallel reexamination proceedings should be considered at trial.  In our prior post, “Is Evidence of Parallel Reexamination Proceedings Admissible at Trial? (Part I of IV)”, we discussed using pending reexamination proceedings to support invalidity contentions.  Accused infringers have also attempted to use evidence of parallel reexamination proceedings to prove inequitable conduct on the part of the patentee. Admissibility in Litigation? 

Reexamination Evidence Used to Prove Inequitable Conduct

To prove inequitable conduct, the infringer must show evidence that the patentee either misrepresented a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material information with the intent to deceive the Patent Office.  Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).  Additionally, at least a “threshold level” of both materiality and intent to deceive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.

Information is considered material where “a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.’”  Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367 (quoting Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  Similarly, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2642 instructs examiners to apply nearly the same standard in determining whether a substantial new question of patentability exists: “A prior art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable.”  Accordingly, where an examiner determines that prior art presents a substantial new question of patentability in granting a request for reexamination, accused infringers assert that such consideration proves the prior art’s materiality.  This argument is enhanced when, during reexamination, the examiner issues a rejection based on that information.  The Federal Circuit itself has stated that “the result of a PTO proceeding that assesses patentability in light of information not originally disclosed can be of strong probative value in determining whether the undisclosed information was material.”  Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  See also 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Dupont Dow Elastomers, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44877, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2005) (“Evidence of the result of the completed reexamination proceedings could be highly relevant to … inequitable conduct allegations at trial . . . .   On the other hand, admission of evidence of an incomplete reexamination would have low probative value, would distract from the core issues of the case, and would be highly prejudicial”).  Thus, at least where reexamination is complete, the results of that reexamination may be important in determining the materiality of a reference.  What is not clear is when the proceedings of a reexamination which is not yet complete can help determine materiality.

In a recent case considering this issue, the defendants took a cue from the Federal Circuit and attempted to apply the idea behind Molins where a request for reexamination had been granted, but no final decision had been made.  In Intel Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, after the USPTO granted the relevant request for reexamination, the defendants sought to supplement their summary judgment motions with evidence of the grant.  They argued that the grant of the request was probative to an inequitable conduct analysis, specifically to the element of materiality.  No. 06-cv-551 (E.D. Tex. April 9, 2009) (order denying motion to supplement).  The outcome however, was not as the defendants would have hoped.  The court was critical of the defendants’ delay in filing for reexamination and of defendants’ delay in moving to supplement their summary judgment motions, noting that such delays “weigh[ed] heavily against supplementation.”  Id. at  4.  It then distinguished Molins based on the status of the reexamination proceedings.  The court determined that the mere grant of a request for reexamination was not probative of either willfulness or inequitable conduct.  Id.

As will be discussed in subsequent posts, alleged infringers have also recently attempted to use evidence of granted reexamination requests to rebut charges of willful infringement and to oppose motions for preliminary injunction.

On December 15, 2009, Chief Judge William K. Sessions III of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied a stay in the patent litigation between Synventive Molding Solutions, Inc. (“Synventive”) v. Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. (“Husky”), Case No. 2:08-cv-136. Husky had filed a motion to stay the patent litigation based on requests for reexamination of the three patents-in-suit. However, as of the time of Judge Sessions’ decision denying Husky’s motion to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the reexamination proceedings, the requests for reexamination has not yet received filing dates. In deciding whether to grant Husky’s motion to stay the patent litigation, Judge Sessions considered whether (1) a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (2) a stay would simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set. The judge held that actual prejudice to Synventive does not appear to be significant given the availability of money damages for past and ongoing infringement. In the ruling, the judge stated that “[r]eexamination will still leave this Court with triable issues however, even if the reexamination is granted and some claims are amended or canceled upon reexamination. Were the case to be stayed pending reexamination, in all likelihood the parties would require additional discovery on the issues remaining to be tried….Granting a stay would therefore substantially increase the total time necessary to resolve the litigation. The reexamination proceeding may or may not simplify the issues remaining for trial….The parties have engaged in unusually acrimonious discovery practice, which is now drawing to a close. A trial date has been set. The Court can perceive no advantage to delaying the resolution of this litigation.” Weighing heavily in favor of denying the stay were the closeness of the trial, the potential two year delay in resolving the patentability issues in reexamination, and that the reexamination proceedings would not resolve all the issues in the litigation.

In a prior blog entry, we discussed why it is important to conduct a thorough prior art search prior to filing a request for inter partes reexamination.  In short, the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) is intended to limit the third-party requester to a single bite at the invalidity apple.  Any prior art patents and printed publications discovered after the request for reexamination is filed may be excluded as a basis for invalidity in litigation if that prior art was publicly accessible when the request for inter partes reexamination was filed. What if a party is contemplating whether to suggest an interference with a patent or to request inter partes reexamination of the patent?  This may be the case, for example, Continue Reading To Search or Not to Search (for prior art) When Contemplating Whether to Provoke an Interference

In an earlier post, we inquired whether patent claims at the PTO are treated like a “nose of wax.”  Generally, a claim examined by the PTO is given its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the specification of the application or patent in which it appears.  One notable exception to the general rule arises in interferences where an applicant “copies” the claim of a targeted patent or application to provoke the interference.  In this case, if a party challenges the patentability of the “copied” claim pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the “copied” claim is interpreted in light of the specification of the targeted patent or applicationSee Agilent v. Affymetrix, 567 F.3d 1366, 91 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   A request for an en banc rehearing of the Agilent panel decision was denied by the Federal Circuit.  In Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”) v. Cardiac Science Operating Company (“Cardiac Science”) (Fed. Cir. case No. 2009-1241), a second panel of the Federal Circuit has maintained that, when a party challenges the patentability of a “copied” claim Continue Reading “Nose of Wax” Revisited and Should 35 USC § 145 be Revised to Apply to Reexaminations?

FotoMedia Technologies, LLC (“FMT”) owned by Scenera Research, has asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 6,018,774, 6,542,936 and 6,871,231 purportedly covering photo-sharing websites against more than 60 companies, including inter alia AOL, CBS, Yahoo, Sprint, Nokia, and Scripps in a number lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (Marshall) in 2007 and 2008. Each of these patents have been subjected to reexamination in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Reexamination Control Nos. for these patents are 90/010,144; 90/010,143 and 90/010,145. Each of the reexamined patents are currently under Final Rejection (the’ 145 was issued an Advisory Action on 12/14/09), which will likely necessitate appeals to the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) by FMT to overcome the Examiners’ rejections of the claims asserted in these lawsuits. FMT’s lawyers have sought a stay of the pending law suits to await the conclusions of the reexamination proceedings or in the alternative dismissal of the suits without prejudice to refile them at a later date. FMT avers that it wants to conserve judicial resources while the reexaminations of the asserted patents proceed. Zazzle.com and Scripps Networks have already filed an opposition to the motion for stay.   Since judges in the Eastern District of Texas are usually reluctant to stay litigation pending the outcome of reexamination proceedings, it will be interesting to see how they rule in view of the fact that the stay is being requested by the patent owner rather than by the accused infringers.

In a growing trend, district courts are using their discretion to deny motions to stay patent infringement litigation in light of concurrent proceedings at the USPTO.  In an earlier post, we commented on the Northern District of California’s deviation from that trend.  In Advanced Analogic Technologies, Inc. v. Kinetic Technolgies, Inc., the concurrent proceeding was an inter partes reexam.  In LG Electronics USA Inc. et al (“LG”) v. Whirlpool Corporation (“Whirlpool”) (Case No. 1-08-cv-00234), the defendant’s motion to stay was denied consistent with the trend to deny such motions and the concurrent proceeding was an interference. Judge Gregory M. Sleet of the District Court of Delaware denied Whirlpool’s motion to stay pending the outcome of an interference involving LG’s patents-in-suit.  The patents-in-suit are Continue Reading Is the Declaration of an Interference Enough to Stay a District Court Litigation?

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in Cook, Inc. v. Endologix, Inc. (Case No. 1:09-cv-01248) has stayed the litigation of Cook’s stent patents pending the outcome of the ex parte reexaminations of the patents-in-suit. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,755,777 and 5,035, 706 (now expired) have been asserted by Cook against Endologix’s Powerlink and IntuiTrak systems covering stent grafts and methods of their use in treatment of abdominal aortic aneurysms. The stay of litigation was granted despite the fact that the parties are direct competitors, Cook claimed that it was in a weak financial condition and Endologix’s sales of purported infringing sales were increasing. With the ’706 patent already expired and the ’777 patent set to expire in 2011, the patent owner will be precluded from amending or adding new claims during reexamination of the ’706 patent and the ’777 patent as well, if the reexamination of the ’777 patent is not concluded by the time the patent expires. In such circumstances, MPEP § 2258(I) suggests that patent claims in the reexamination will be interpreted in the USPTO in the same manner as a judge in the district court or International Trade Commission would do in litigation.  However, as discussed in a prior blog post, a panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Intererences concluded In Ex parte Personalized Media Communications, Inc., Appeals 2007-4044 and 2008-0334, Reexamination Control Nos. 90/006,697, 90/006,841, and 90/006,800 (BPAI, 2008) that claim language of an expired patent can be construed more narrowly than its ordinary and customary meaning only to the extent needed to resolve an ambiguity.  If the claim term is clear, the panel concluded that the broad reasonable standard generally applied by the USPTO should be used.  See also Ex parte Peng Tan, Appeal 2006-3235, Reexamination Control No. 90/006,696 (BPAI, 2008)(affirmed by the Fed. Cir.).

Several courts have recently been faced with the issue of whether evidence of parallel reexamination proceedings should be admissible at trial. Parties in these cases have attempted to use the existence of pending reexamination proceedings to prove or disprove invalidity, inequitable conduct, and willful infringement. Opponents generally argue that evidence of parallel reexamination proceedings is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and/or contrary to the statutory presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282.
Admissibility in Litigation?
Presented with both points of view, the rulings of courts vary, and whether this evidence is allowed tends to depend on the circumstances of the case. Many courts quickly reject the evidence; however, there appears to be a trend of courts giving reexamination evidence more consideration. Of those courts that seriously contemplate admission of the evidence, many place significant weight on the stage of advancement of the reexamination proceeding – ranging from a simple grant of reexamination, to rejections of the reexamined patent’s claims, to completion of the reexamination proceedings. The stage of the litigation also plays an important role, as this determines whether the evidence will be considered by a judge or a jury. More than one opinion distinguishes admission of reexamination evidence for summary judgment purposes from admission for jury consideration. Whether the entity requesting reexamination is the patentee or the accused infringer can also influence admissibility of reexamination evidence in litigation. See, e.g., TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (E.D. Tex. 2007).

Reexamination Evidence Used to Support Invalidity

Generally, when reexamination evidence is used to support contentions of patent claim invalidity, the alleged infringers do not simply attempt to equate the grant of a request for reexamination with patent claim invalidity. Patent owners could rebut that argument merely with statistics showing that there is little correlation between the Patent Office’s grant of reexamination and the ultimate patentability of the claims under reexamination. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1594 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that in 1994, 89% of reexamination requests were granted, but only 5.6% of the reexamined patents were completely rejected with no confirmed or allowed claims remaining after reexamination; Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106795, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (stating that, according to 2007 data, the USPTO grants 92% of requests for reexamination, but in only 12% all claims are subsequently canceled).

Instead, accused infringers often attempt to use the grant of reexamination to substantiate their invalidity contentions. The argument is that an alleged infringer’s invalidity contentions are entitled to more weight where the Patent Office has found at least some substantial new question of patentability based on those same arguments. This argument has been largely unsuccessful. “The grant of a request for reexamination, although surely evidence that the criterion for reexamination has been met … does not establish a likelihood of patent [claim] invalidity.” Id. at 1584. See also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (cautioning that “a requestor’s burden to show that a reexamination order should issue from the PTO is unrelated to a defendant’s burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence at trial.”); Amphenol T&M Antennas Inc. v. Centurion Intern. Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822, at *4-5 (“As a probative matter, the Patent Office’s decision to grant reexamination casts the validity of the patent into some doubt, but only to a small degree . . . . The likelihood that some or all of the patent claims will be invalidated as a result of the reexamination proceedings is impossible to calculate with any reasonable degree of certainty, but statistically, it is not great.”)

In disallowing this attempt to support patent claim invalidity arguments with an order granting reexamination, many courts weigh the potential prejudice of the reexamination evidence against its probative value under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. More often than not, these courts determine that the probative value is far outweighed by the potential prejudice. See, e.g., Amphenol, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 822 at *5 (“[T]hat the patent has been called into question by the Patent Office may significantly influence the jury’s application of the presumption of validity and significantly prejudice ATM. The prejudicial potential of this evidence far outweighs any probative value it may have.”); SRI Intern., Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73981, at *86 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2009) (“Absent unusual circumstances … non-final decisions made during reexamination are not binding, moreover, they are more prejudicial (considering the overwhelming possibility of jury confusion) than probative of validity; i4i Ltd. P’ship & Infrastructures for Info. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *53-54 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009) (“Even if [the grant of a request for reexamination] was [probative], its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in suggesting to the jury that it is entitled to ignore both the presumption of validity and the defendant’s clear and convincing burden at trial.”). At least one court, however, found that the prejudicial effect of reexamination evidence might be neutralized by an appropriate jury instruction. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Intern., Inc., No. 03-cv-1431, Order Denying Motion to Strike at 6 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006). That court did not, however, provide an example of an acceptable jury instruction.

Recent cases in this area, although continuing to weigh probative value against prejudicial effect, have taken an interesting twist. These courts are now focusing more on the presumption of validity, found in 35 U.S.C. § 282, and have shown some indication that patentees may not always be able to tout this presumption where reexamination is ongoing.

In the district court case of Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., Callaway, the patent owner, boasted in its opening statement that three patent examiners had concluded the asserted patents were valid by virtue of their allowance and issue. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Callaway did not mention that a reexamination was pending and that the Patent Office had rejected each of the patent claims asserted at trial. Id. The accused infringer, Acushnet, sought to introduce evidence of the parallel reexamination proceeding. The district court refused to allow Acushnet to mention the reexamination proceeding but also precluded any further similar statements by the patent owner concerning the conclusions of the Patent Office in allowing the asserted patents. Id. On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Acushnet requested a new trial based on the district court’s prohibition of the reexamination evidence. The Federal Circuit agreed that Callaway’s opening statement was potentially misleading: “Acushnet is correct that Callaway’s opening statement, while truthful, nevertheless had potential to mislead the jury by implying that every expert examiner to have considered the patents had concluded that they were valid.” Id. The Federal Circuit ultimately found that the district court had not abused its discretion, however, because, Acushnet did not object during Callaway’s opening statement and the district court disallowed repetition of similar statements. Id. at 1342-1343.

More recently, in Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp., a district court found evidence of reexamination proceedings unfairly prejudicial. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106795 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009). At the outset of trial, however, the court prohibited the patent owner from referencing the presumption of validity. “With any reference of the ‘presumption of validity’ excluded, allowing the jury to hear about incomplete USPTO proceedings will be unfairly prejudicial to [the patent owner], and could potentially confuse the jury as to who has what burden throughout the trial.” Id. at *6, n.1. The court emphasized that the reexamination proceedings were still incomplete and distinguished cases at the summary judgment stage, where admission of the evidence would not result in jury confusion. Id. at *7.

As will be discussed in subsequent posts, alleged infringers have also recently attempted to use evidence of granted reexamination requests to prove inequitable conduct, rebut charges of willful infringement, and/or oppose motions for preliminary injunction.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia in E-Z-GO v. Club Car, Inc. (Case No. 1:09-cv-119) has stayed the litigation of E-Z-GO’s patent pending the outcome of inter partes reexamination.  E-Z-GO asserts that two of Club Car’s currently marketed electric vehicles infringe U.S. Patent No. 7,332,881, entitled “AC Drive System for Electrically Operated Vehicle.” The court granted Club Car’s motion to stay the litigation pending the outcome of reexamination despite the fact that the PTO has not yet granted Club Car’s request for inter partes reexamination of the ‘881 patent.  In granting the stay, the court noted that the PTO grants 95% of all requests for inter partes reexamination, and that the stay could be lifted if the PTO declines to grant Club Car’s request for inter partes reexamination.