PTAB estoppel

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PTAB-legislation

Estoppel Future Uncertain

As pointed out last month, the SCOTUS has sought the Solicitor General’s input in Apple et al., v. California Institute of Technology. If the case is taken up, the Court will consider limiting the scope of IPR estoppel to art that was included in the petition, and that art which reasonably could have been raised “during the IPR.”

At present, “reasonably could have raised” is assessed at the time the petition is drafted (i.e., what could have been included in the petition), not what could have been included in the later trial (which is effectively nothing). While it is far from certain whether the Court will take the case — let alone narrow estoppel— petitioners might still consider their stipulation wording until this dispute is settled.Continue Reading Sotera Stipulations to Haunt PTAB Petitioners?

Re-work Frustrates Patent Owners & The System

I have written about Patent Owner estoppel for years. That is, estoppel stemming from claims cancelled in PTAB trial proceedings. This estoppel is based on the idea that, if you have an amendment to bring to a given claim set, you should bring that amendment during the trial — not thereafter, such as in a patent reissue, reexamination or continuation application.

Rule 42.73 (d)(3)(i) explains that a Patent Applicant or a Patent Owner is precluded from taking action inconsistent with a claim cancellation, including, obtaining in any patent a claim that is not patentably distinct from a finally refused or cancelled claim. But, it is fairly common for unsuccessful Patent Owners to go right back after a PTAB loss and pursue substantively identical claims through patent reissue or reexamination. Why?

Patent Owners are not gluttons for punishment, they are just following the directions of the agency.Continue Reading PTAB Estoppel is Confused By the USPTO

PTAB Estoppel & Inequitable Conduct

Inequitable conduct before the USPTO is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars enforcement of a patent. Thereasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  Given the increasing inventory of Final Written Decisions (FWD) in larger patent portfolios, practitioners are only now beginning to confront issues of inequitable conduct relating to agency based estoppel.  That is, if a patent owner advances a position inconsistent with a previous PTAB FWD on a patent/related patent under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3), whether such a practice constitutes inequitable conduct. It just might.

But, for the time being, the courts’ lack of experience with the PTAB’s rule-based estoppel is benefiting patent owners.
Continue Reading Patent Prosecution After an Adverse PTAB FWD – Beware

District of Delaware Considers Physical Products & Redundant Publications

Back in August, I pointed out that district courts continue to grapple with whether or not physical products described by prior art publications of an earlier Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) trial are subject to 315(e)(2) estoppel. That is, by virtue of utilizing a product manual in the earlier PTAB proceeding, whether the actual products corresponding to such a manual can be considered “raised, or reasonably could have been raised” under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).

The view of some districts has been that since physical products can’t be raised at the PTAB, such evidence is simply outside the scope of estoppel.  Others take a narrower view, weighing the potential technical superiority of the physical product to the previously used publication.  In another twist on this fact pattern, the District of Delaware recently considered whether the underlying evidence of these disputes should be the focus at all.
Continue Reading PTAB Estoppel: Grounds vs. Evidence

Adding New Blood into the Estoppel Mix

IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) provides that “the petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not assert . . . in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” (emphasis added).  As pointed out previously, a growing number of district courts have construed the phrase the “reasonably could have raised” aspect of 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2) to define grounds that a party could have included in its petition, but did not.

Assuming a failed petitioner can locate a piece of prior art that it could not have raised earlier (and make the appropriate showing to avoid estoppel) are combinations with failed art of the IPR precluded?
Continue Reading Rehabilitating Failed PTAB Art

Reasonably Could Have Raised & Reasonably Diligent

Prior to last year’s SAS decision, district courts split over whether non-petitioned grounds were embraced by the “reasonably could have raised” aspect of 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2) and 325(e)(2) estoppel.  However, a growing number of district courts post-SAS have construed this phrase to define grounds that a party could have included in its petition, but did not.  In doing so, the courts are also making clear that the burden of proving that a ground could have reasonably have been raised, lies with the Patent Owner.
Continue Reading Courts Apply More Flexible Analysis to PTAB Estoppel

“Known or Used” Not a Side-Step to PTAB Estoppel

Keeping with yesterday’s discussion of Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) estoppel in the district courts, a decision from earlier this year on yet another aspect of this estoppel has been recalibrated. Back in January, the Central District of California explained in The California Institute of Technology v. Broadcom Limited, et al., that IPR estoppel (35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2)) applies where the same IPR reference is later raised in court under the “known or used” prong of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) instead of as a “patent or printed publication” as done in the IPR.

Upon Motion for reconsideration, the Court has agreed that it’s earlier Order required further clarification.
Continue Reading Courts Continue to Explore Reach of PTAB Estoppel & Standards for Assessing Exceptions

User Manuals & Corresponding Product Estoppel under 315(e)(2)

District courts continue to grapple with whether or not physical products described by prior art publications of an earlier Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) trial are subject to estoppel. That is, by virtue of utilizing product manuals in the earlier PTAB proceeding, whether the actual products described “were raised, or reasonably could have been raised” under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).

The view of some districts has been that it does not, unless the Patent Owner (estoppel proponent) demonstrates that the product described in the previously examined manual is technically superior to the manual teachings. Yet, other districts are adopting an absolute prohibition..
Continue Reading Physical Counterparts of PTAB Utilized Product Manuals Estopped in Some Districts

Burden on Patent Owner to Show Product Manual Available

Does the use of a printed manual at the PTAB foreclose later use of the underlying product in litigation? We know from cases like In Star EnviroTech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC et. al., 8-12-cv-01861 (CACD January 29, 2015, Order) that where a product is superior to a publication in terms of relevant detail, it is considered outside of the reach of 315(e) estoppel.

But what about where the product is the same as a manual that could have been used in the IPR?
Continue Reading Avoiding PTAB Estoppel with Physical Product Combinations

Estopping a Winning Argument?

One of the stranger developments of recent months has been the interpretation of PTAB estoppel (315(e)(2)) to foreclose a petitioner from pursuing arguments in a district court that were successful at the PTAB. That is, a petitioner that has successfully defeated claims at the PTAB, and has received a Final Written Decision (FWD) explaining the same, is thereafter estopped from making the same successful arguments in court.

Earlier this month, the government supported this position in an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit in BTG v. Amneal. In it’s brief, the government explains that its interpretation leads to the “counterintuitive result that the district court would not be able to consider invalidity arguments that the Board found persuasive.”

Aside from interpreting the statute to be “counterintuitive” in the first instance, which is canon of sorts in statutory construction, it also requires one to construe estoppel as somehow guarding against consistency.
Continue Reading PTAB Estoppel as a Sword and Shield?